Posts for Monroe Capital Plus

Fieldwood Energy: IIIQ 2020 Update

Dedicated readers with an interest in the “energy-calypse” (trademark pending) will remember that we last wrote about Fieldwood Energy LLC on August 4, 2020. That was when the E&P producer achieved a Chapter Twenty Two – filing for Chapter 11 protection twice. The first time was in 2018. At that point there were three BDCs with $13.3mn in exposure to the company’s debt. Leading the pack was Barings BDC (BBDC) with $10mn, followed by non-traded Monroe Capital Income Plus Corp and NexPoint Capital with just over $3mn invested between them.

We promised at the time to circle back to Fieldwood once we hear about whether the court is in agreement with the proposed plan and when we can evaluate what the company’s balance sheet – and business prospects – might look like going forward“. However, the most interesting news since our last article is that BBDC has thrown in the towel – not unreasonably given the circumstances – and booked a realized loss in the IIIQ 2020 from the disposition of its investment. The BDC did not explicitly spell out what the realized loss was but we know that the $10.063mn at cost had an FMV of $1.817mn at June. This suggests the loss was somewhere between ($8mn) and ($10mn). Given that there was no interest forthcoming as the debt was on non accrual from the IIQ, income is unaffected. BBDC booked ($21mn) in net realized losses in the quarter, so this was a material setback, even if expected.

The other two non-traded BDCs continue to have exposure to Fieldwood. The company has arranged a $100mn DIP facility and is seeking to sell its assets. As far as we can tell, the business remains under court protection. From the BDC Credit Reporter’s standpoint, this has become a “non material” company given that the remaining FMV is only $0.75mn.

Whatever the final outcome – and prospects do not look encouraging – this is yet another example – if any were needed – that lending to E&P companies is fraught with risk and not appropriate in almost any situation and at any position in the capital structure.

Fieldwood Energy: Files Chapter 11

With all the sense of inevitability of an ancient Greek drama, yet another energy company has filed for bankruptcy protection. This time it’s Fieldwood Energy, LLCa premier independent E&P company in the Gulf of Mexico“.  Based on the company’s press release, the company already has a formal restructuring plan to submit to the bankruptcy court, agreed to by two-thirds of its senior lenders. Once again a company and its creditors are looking to the “debt for equity swap” as the solution for what ails the business. Also – as per the usual – Fieldwood has arranged a Debtor-In-Possession (“DIP”) facility and is using cash on hand to fund liquidity needs while going through the bankruptcy process. The amount of the DIP, though, is not given.

There are three BDCs with exposure – all in the first lien debt – to Fieldwood: $13.3mn. The only public BDC is Barings BDC (BBDC), which also has the only material exposure: $10.1mn. The rest is held by non traded Monroe Capital Income Plus and NexPoint Capital. The loan – now on non accrual -is priced at just LIBOR + 525 bps, suggesting lenders believed this was a “safe” energy loan (to our minds a clear oxymoron) when first booked back in 2018.

However, the investment has been in trouble for some time, rated as underperforming as far back as IQ 2020, long before Covid-19 drastically reduced market demand for fossil fuels. The BDC Credit Reporter has been writing about the company since April 15, 2020 and had already downgraded Fieldwood to a CCR 4 rating, and placed the name on our Weakest Links list. Now the company has been downgraded to CCR 5 and added to the Bankruptcy list.

For BBDC this is a telling reminder that no energy loan is safe in a world where oil can trade at $100 a barrel one day and at next to nothing a few years later. These single focus businesses cannot handle almost any amount of debt when their main product is subject to such drastic fluctuations. In this case BBDC, and the other lenders, look likely to be left with equity of dubious value and may have to stump up more funds with no great confidence that this time the right capital structure has been found.

We’ll circle back to Fieldwood once we hear about whether the court is in agreement with the proposed plan and when we can evaluate what the company’s balance sheet – and business prospects – might look like going forward.

BJ Services Company: Files Chapter 11

Reuters reports that oil field services company BJ Services Company has filed for Chapter 11 on July 20, 2020. The company reported assets and liabilities between $500mn and $1.0bn. Right away, management will be seeking to sell core assets – such as its cementing business – to pay down its debts. Not helping the situation for BJ Services is an admitted “cash crunch”.

Four BDCs have $25.3mn in exposure at cost in the company as of March 31, 2020: Crescent Capital (CCAP); Monroe Capital (MRCC); Garrison Capital (GARS) and non-traded Monroe Capital Income Plus. The BDCs were all in the same 2023 first lien term loan, and marked their positions at par or at a discount of only (4%). Given the industry which BJ operates in; the sizeable liabilities and the liquidity crisis, it seems unlikely that the current high valuation can be maintained in bankruptcy. However, we have no clear idea yet how this debt might fare once everything is settled. We can calculate, though, that ($1.8mn) of investment income on an annual basis will be suspended.

The BDC most at risk of loss is CCAP, which owns about half the outstandings and which is involved in a last out arrangement, which should result in a bigger eventual capital loss.

Frankly, the BDC Credit Reporter has been caught flat footed by BJ’s bankruptcy. The company was carried as performing (CCR 2) in our database because of the near-par valuation by all its lenders. In retrospect, the fact that a oil services firm like this one should stumble is no great surprise. In any case, we have leapfrogged the company’s rating down three levels to CCR 5, or non performing. We’ll be reverting with more details on how the bankruptcy might play out for the BDC lenders involved once we learn more about the company’s plans.

As a parting thought, we do wonder why any BDC would lend to an oil services company – even a giant one – given the well known wreckage of so many similar businesses since 2014. This debt was booked in 2019. Perhaps the recovery the BDC lenders will ultimately achieve will prove us wrong but – if past is prologue – expect that losses will be material and for a loan that was priced at a modest LIBOR + 7.00%.